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Abstract We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some
important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group
decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) out-
come for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute
the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst them-
selves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make
effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing
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to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high ef-
fort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show
that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence
of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the
poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sus-
tained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in
the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes,
not in Rousseau.
Keywords Redistribution · Political equilibrium · Voting ·Multiple equilibria ·
Experiments
JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D72 · E24 · H24 · I31 · O38
1 Introduction
The welfare state is viewed as a remarkable achievement of modern societies. It is
credited with large reductions of poverty in developed countries (see e.g. Moller et
al. 2003).1 It certainly eases the pain of negative shocks to income and utility com-
ing from cyclical involuntary unemployment, health problems and even structural
economic changes that leave the skills of some members of society outdated. It is ob-
vious, at the same time, that this reduction of uncertainty can come accompanied by
large negative effects on incentives to exert productive effort in different dimensions.
It lowers the incentives of the unemployed to look for jobs, to work when minor
health afflictions arise, to maintain human capital up to date, or to choose judiciously
the line of business in which to work (Atkinson 1995).2
The welfare state can thus serve as a form of social insurance. The negative in-
centive effects of any kind of insurance are known as “moral hazard”. But, unlike in
private insurance, redistribution from the “lucky” to the “unlucky” in social insurance
is not done through some kind of ex-ante contract, but through voting. And at the time
of voting, individuals already know the cards that economic life has dealt them. In
the short run they can vote, if “poor,” to appropriate resources from the “rich,” or, if
“rich,” to avoid this expropriation. All this without even taking into account the neg-
ative effects on incentives of this purely redistributive conflict, or the insurance value
of redistribution.
The pessimistic depiction of voting about redistribution expressed in the previous
paragraph is what we will call the Hobbesian point of view. To this view, we also
oppose a Rousseaunian perspective. The negative incentive effects of the welfare
1
“Researchers have found that the size of the welfare state (for example, as measured by spending on
social programs) is a key determinant of poverty reduction,” Moller et al. (2003) p. 1.
2This was clear even to the predecessor of the modern welfare state, the Poor Laws of the 1830s. They
were based explicitly on the twin principles that relief to poverty should be provided in the workhouse and
that the poor should not be better off without work than at work. In the words of Porteous (1783): “every
person on charity should descend at least one step below the station which he occupied in the season of
health and labor.”
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state on incentives do not have to happen, even in a world of selfish and forward-
looking agents. They can engage in a beneficial social contract where redistribution
and high effort are not incompatible. That social contract is possible precisely because
the Hobbesian world exists. In such world, any “sucker” who made effort would be
exploited by the “wise guys” who would free-ride on the efforts of others, and would
vote themselves into sharing the returns from their effort. The Hobbesian world can
become the “credible” punishment that gives incentives for all individuals to work
hard, and redistribute only to insure against economic shocks that occur “through no
fault of their own.” But the fact that the Rousseaunian perspective is an equilibrium
possibility does not mean that it will occur, given that the Hobbesian world is also an
equilibrium.
Given that theory does not provide too much guidance in problems of equilibrium
selection, and given the difficulty of field testing any theory with multiple equilibria,
we decided to conduct a laboratory experiment to sort out the different possibilities
empirically. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make
a costly effort.3 If they choose high effort, the individual outcome is a high level of
income with probability 2/3 and a low level of income with the complementary prob-
ability. If they choose low effort, income is low for sure. The group members then
vote on whether to redistribute equally the total income of the group (without deduct-
ing the cost of effort). This design intends to mimic the features of the (admittedly
stylized) welfare state we have been discussing above, and giving the Rousseaunian
“social contract” a fair chance of working. To this end, for example, the group is kept
relatively small, with only nine players, and the aggregate effort is observed every
period before voting and repeating the game. This is the environment we could think
of where a “social contract” equilibrium has an easiest chance to appear. At the same
time, it is sufficiently rich so that the incentive problems associated with the welfare
state are also possible.
Indeed, when played only once (in a static framework) the game we just described
has two equilibria. This is perhaps a surprise, as the traditional view tends to make the
possibility of the welfare state an apocalyptic threat on honest effort. To understand
the equilibrium structure, first notice that, in the static game, it is weakly dominant for
the individuals with high income to vote against redistribution and for the individuals
with low income to vote in its favor. Anticipating this, the players face a sort of
coordination game. If all of them make effort, it is quite likely that most of them will
be rich (and there will be no redistribution), so as long as expected utility of the extra
output created from the high effort compensates the cost, they are prepared to do it.
On the other hand, if no one makes an effort, most people will have low output with
certainty, so a lone player contributing high effort will see most of its proceeds taken
away from him. These two equilibria are Pareto-ranked, with the one with high effort
being more efficient.4
In the repeated game, redistribution with high effort is sustainable during most of
the game, even if there is a finite number of repetitions. The “social contract” equilib-
rium establishes that up until the last few periods players should make effort and vote
3Except in one of the treatments.
4Remember that no effort-no income is a possible choice in the all-effort equilibrium. If it is not chosen,
it must be because the players prefer to make costly effort and obtain a random level of income.
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for redistribution. As long as that happens, the last few periods are characterized by
the high-effort no-redistribution static equilibrium. Any deviation from the equilib-
rium path is “punished” by reversion to the no-effort equilibrium. This is a credible
punishment, as it is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
The experimental results show that the Rousseaunian social contract of redistri-
bution with high effort is not sustainable in the laboratory. The few times when we
observe redistribution with high effort, it does not last very long. The main reason is
that voting behavior does not vary with the observation of different levels of aggre-
gate effort. Furthermore, even the static equilibrium with high effort is fragile. It is
sustained to the end of the game in very few groups. More frequently several players
start making effort, only to give up later in the game. The no-effort equilibrium, on
the other hand, seems quite robust. The worst Hobbesian outcome seems to be the
most common fate of our experimental societies. We think this is an important result
that shows why in reality the welfare state seems to be constantly under threat, and
why societies which see its good effects have to devise complicated mechanisms to
keep it in place.
In our main treatment, the rich very seldom vote for redistribution. This could
be because they cannot condition their behavior on the reason why each of the poor
is poor. We introduced two additional treatments to test further whether rich peo-
ple would like to have a differential behavior toward those who are poor “through
no fault of their own.” Thus, in some treatments we changed the voting procedure,
either demanding unanimity for redistribution, or excluding non-effort makers from
redistribution. These changes make high effort robust and sustainable, but they do
not yield redistribution very often. We also include a treatment where there is no ef-
fort decision. Income realizations are random and exogenous to the subjects. This is
an important control treatment in order to check to which extent voting behavior is
influenced by past observations of effort levels.
Our results indicate that agents play political games in a manner which does not
punish or reward past actions. Hence, the behavior of our subjects is consistent with
the Markov perfect equilibria which are the main focus of the political economy lit-
erature, since they do not seem to condition their voting decisions in payoff irrelevant
events. In our context this means, for example, that subjects do not condition their
effort decision in one period on the outcome of voting and redistribution in the pre-
vious period, or they do not condition their vote for redistribution on whether a poor
person has made a costly effort or not.
As with all experimental research, there is a question about the external validity
of our experimental results. In this respect we would like to point out that as Schram
(2005) argues “External validity is relatively more important for experiments search-
ing for empirical regularities than for theory-testing experiments,” and quoting Plott
(1982), he adds “Plott takes the position that experiments do not need to be realistic
so long as they closely implement the theory being tested.” Ours is clearly a theory-
testing experiment, since we were endeavoring to find out which of the different theo-
retical possibilities arose in our environment. Furthermore, although the setting is not
completely natural, neither is it absolutely artificial. Real people do vote in elections
where redistribution is an important consideration. In our setting there is a cost of
producing the potential reward that can be redistributed, but this effort does not al-
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ways yield fruit. At a minimum, we believe our results to be to sufficiently suggestive
to make a good case for further field testing of the ideas.
2 Related literature
The literature has addressed related issues. Lindbeck et al. (1999) suggest that the
welfare state breaks down when people start breaking the implicit contract that lies at
its root: “you work hard, and if you are unlucky, we will help you.” A similar motif
can be glanced in the work of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), in this case guided
through fairness concerns internalized in the utility function.
Most experimental papers on voting study committee behavior or the paradox of
voting (e.g. Fiorina and Plott (1978), Schram and Sonnemans (1996)). There are a
few voting experiments related to ours. Many papers study the problem of voting
in the context of contribution in public good games with only one equilibrium. Sut-
ter and Weck-Hannemann (2004), for example, show that players contribute less if
there is a minimum compulsory level of contribution which is determined through
voting. Sutter et al. (2010), also in a public good experiment, give the option to vote
about implementing reward or punishment. Subjects vote in favor of rewarding high
contributions and obtain a more efficient outcome.
Some papers study voting on redistribution in a context in which a random draw
determines whether a player is rich or poor. Thus, Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) show
that, in a one shot game, the unique equilibrium with social preferences à la Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) predicts voting patterns by rich and poor better than the unique self-
interested Nash equilibrium. Sutter (2002) finds that players show solidarity between
them, voting against a public good which would increase total surplus but may harm
some players, a behavior which is contradictory with the unique Nash-equilibrium
prediction.
There are experiments which endogenize the received income through different
effort mechanisms. In experiments by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990) the redis-
tribution scheme is determined either exogenously by the experimenters or by the
subjects. In the latter case the subjects vote for a redistribution scheme from rich to
poor under the veil of ignorance, that is, before knowing one’s type and the real ef-
fort task to be performed afterward. Then, they receive an income which increases
with the number of errors they find in a given text. They find that effort level in-
creases after a transfer is received, if redistribution is decided endogenously. Under
exogenously determined scheme this effect is not observed.5 One problem with this
approach is that at the time of voting subjects do not know whether success is de-
termined through effort, luck or personal characteristics (as skill). In addition using
“costly” mouse click task as in our paper instead of real tasks has the advantage of
easily disentangling whether increasing or decreasing effort levels can be attributed
to changes of effort levels of others, instead of, say, attributing it to learning of the
5Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) designated a controller through several methods ranging from a random
assignment to being the winner of a game of skill. The controller can decide on the distribution of money
between himself and others. The distribution varies greatly with the method to choose the controller.
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task. In any case, our focus is not as much on the effort level produced given a certain
degree of redistribution, as on the voting patterns that we observe once effort levels
have been determined. We believe that this approach yields higher returns, as in real
life almost everybody votes being aware of their station in life.
Our experiments are also related to the large literature on coordination games as
surveyed in Ochs (1995). Van Huyck et al. (1990) show that behavior typically con-
verges to the inefficient outcomes in large groups of players. Long time horizons,
however, may induce more efficient outcomes as shown in Berninghaus and Ehrhart
(1998). We add to these papers exogenous uncertainty and voting about redistribu-
tion.
Our most important contribution is that we provide a link with the theoretic
macro-political economy literature. We show that subjects behavior is consistent with
Markov equilibria. Payoff irrelevant events, such as last period’s voting outcome or
the reason why someone is poor, are disregarded by voters, and thus, ethical and
moral considerations seem to lay beyond their concern, at least when dealing with
redistribution.
3 The games
We model a politico-economic game of redistribution where agents choose the policy
via a well established voting mechanism once they know their station in life. We
depart from the standard macro model (see Hassler et al. 2003, for instance) in only
two qualitative respects.
First, we do not have state variables. In this manner we abstract from issues related
to rational dynamic voting and from self-reinforcing mechanisms in the determina-
tion of political outcomes (multiple steady states as different from multiple equilib-
ria). We focus on whether subjects condition their actions on past behavior in a way
which allows for the sustainability of the first best. The experimental study of dy-
namic rationality is an important item for future research, but the present question is
sufficiently important to be studied in isolation.
The second way in which we depart from the standard model is by making our set
of voters finite. We do so in order to facilitate the sustainability of the (Rousseaunian)
first best equilibrium. If even in this circumstances it is not sustained, it is difficult to
conceive how it could be sustained with a realistic (much larger) number of agents.
There are 9 players in each group N = {1,2, . . . ,9}. The gameG proceeds in two
stages.
In the first stage, each player i ∈ N takes a decision on whether to make an effort
ei ∈ {e
H , eL}. Effort choice ei = eH has a cost c > 0. Effort choice ei = eL has no
cost. The outcome from this effort choice is a random variable yi, drawn indepen-
dently for all players, with yi ∈ {yH , yL}. Its relationship with effort is as follows.
When ei = eH , then yi = yH with probability 23 and yi = y
L with probability 13 .
When ei = eL, then yi = yL with probability 1. In the second stage, each player
i ∈ N casts a vote vi ∈ {Y,N}. If 5 or more players vote vi = Y , then the final in-
come of every player is yFi =
∑n
j=1 yj/9 (gross of effort costs). If 4 or less players
vote vi = Y , then the final income of every player is yFi = yi (again, gross of effort
6
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costs). Before the second stage, the players know the aggregate realization of the true
stage: How many are rich or poor, how many put effort and the total sum to distribute
(in the design section we go into more details).
The game G is repeated for 50 periods. The repeated game is denoted Ŵ(G).
Let us first analyze theoretically the game G.
Let A denote the expected payoff for agent i, if all players (including i) choose
to make effort, that is, ei = eH . Let also B denote the expected payoff for agent i if
all other players j 6= i choose to make effort, that is, ej = eH but player i chooses to
make no effort, that is, ei = eL. Finally, let C denote the expected payoff for agent i if
all other players j 6= i choose to make no effort, that is, ej = eL but player i chooses
to make effort, that is, ei = eH
Then we have (assuming, as we will show is indeed optimal, that in the second
stage the rich players vote N and poor players vote Y ):6
C is also composed of two terms. The first term is the payoff when there is redis-
tribution and only i made effort, weighted by the probability that i is rich when he is
the only one who made effort. The second term is the payoff for being poor weighted
by the probability that all are poor (i, who made effort and 8 the others who did not).
A≡
8∑
j=5
(
8
j
)
2
3
j 1
3
8−j (2
3
u(yH − c)+
1
3
u(yL − c)
)
+
(
8
4
)
2
3
5 1
3
4
u(yH − c)+
4∑
j=0
(
8
j
)
2
3
j 1
3
9−j
u
(
(yH )j + (yL)(9− j)
9
− c
)
B ≡
8∑
j=5
(
8
j
)
2
3
j 1
3
8−j
u(yL)+
4∑
j=0
(
8
j
)
2
3
j 1
3
8−j
u
(
(yH )j + (yL)(9− j)
9
)
C ≡
2
3
u
(
yH + 8yL
9
− c
)
+
1
3
u(yL − c)
Proposition 1 The game G has two subgame-perfect equilibria if A > B and C <
u(yL). In one of them ei = eH for all i ∈N and in the other one ei = eL for all i ∈N .
In both equilibria, for all i ∈N,vi = Y when yi = yL and vi =N when yi = yH .
6A is composed of three terms, all of which consider a situation where all agents beside i make effort.
The first term of A indicates the expected payoff for i of making effort when there is no redistribution,
weighted by the probability that there is no redistribution because there are at least 5 agents other than
i who are rich. The second term of A indicates the payoff when i is rich and there is no redistribution,
weighted by the probability that i is rich and exactly 4 agents in addition to i are rich, and the last term of
A indicates the expected payoff of redistribution when agent i makes effort, weighted by the probability
that there is redistribution because at least 5 agents are poor.
B is composed of two terms, both considering a situation where all the agents beside i made effort.
One term is the payoff for i when poor and making no effort, weighted by probability that there are at least
5 rich people, and hence no redistribution. The other is the expected payoff of redistribution for i who
made no effort, weighted by the probability that there are at least 5 poor players, including i.
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Proof See the Appendix A. ¤
Both equilibria exist if players have constant relative risk aversion with an Arrow-
Pratt risk aversion coefficient r ≥ 0.2. For r ≤ 0.1, there is only a no effort equilib-
rium. Notice also that if r ≥ 0.2, in the equilibrium where all players make effort,
this is a strict best-response. That is, even if not all other players made effort for sure,
it would still be optimal to make effort.7 Most estimates of risk aversion coefficients
available in the literature point to values of r well in excess of 0.2. For example. At-
tanasio et al. (2002) give a GMM point estimate of r = 1.2 with a standard deviation
of 0.5. Hence it seems safe to conclude that the game our subjects played has indeed
multiple equilibria.
Now we turn to the repeated game, Ŵ(G). The unconditional repetition of the
stage-game equilibria are also equilibria in Ŵ(G). But, when there are two (Pareto-
ranked) equilibria in the state game, we can also look for a third super-game equilib-
rium in which redistribution might be sustainable. In order to see whether cooperation
is sustainable we need to define some more parameters. Let D denote the expected
payoff of player i if all other players j 6= i choose to make effort, that is, ej = eH but
player i chooses to make no effort, that is, ei = eL and there is redistribution for all
realizations of income and E be the expected payoff of i, if all players (including i)
choose to make effort, that is, ei = eH of i if all including i choose effort and there
is redistribution for all realizations of income:
D ≡
8∑
j=0
(
8
j
)
2
3
j 1
3
8−j
u
(
(yH )j + (yL)(9− j)
9
)
and
E ≡
9∑
j=0
(
9
j
)
2
3
j 1
3
9−j
u
(
(yH )j + (yL)(9− j)
9
− c
)
Then we have:
Proposition 2 The repeated game Ŵ(G) has a (Rousseaunian) equilibrium with ef-
fort and redistribution.More precisely, let K such that
D −E <K(A− u(yL))
The game Ŵ(G) has a subgame-perfect equilibrium where in the equilibrium path
in periods t = 1 through 50−K − 1, ei = eH and vi = Y , for all i ∈N .
Proof See the Appendix B. ¤
This equilibrium exists if players have constant relative risk aversion with an
Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient r ≥ 0.3 and the necessary K in this case is
K = 2.
7How many and how far they can go until it is not optimal any more depends on the parameters.
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3.1 Equilibrium with social preferences
Although the repeated game Ŵ(G) has an equilibrium where agents both choose to
make effort and redistribution, it would be legitimate to ask if there are other cir-
cumstances in which one could expect a Rousseaunian equilibrium. This is indeed
the case if subjects have preferences which take into account the material payoff of
other players. Suppose, for example, that players are as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
That is, let ui be the expected material payoff of player i in the game. Then, total
preferences for player i (including the “social preferences”) are:
Ui = ui −
α
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
max{(uj − ui),0} −
β
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
max{(ui − uj ),0}
With these preferences, it is easy to show that poor agents still want to vote for
redistribution. Rich agents vote for redistribution (for all income realizations in the
group) if they are sufficiently risk averse and have strong enough social preferences.
For example, if they have constant relative risk aversion and their Arrow-Pratt coef-
ficient r ≥ 0.5, and the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) coefficient β ≥ 0.8. With those
same preferences, there would be an all-effort equilibrium as well as a no-effort
equilibrium. In the all-effort equilibrium there are two things that work to impede
a deviation. One is that the income realizations are worse (in the sense of first or-
der stochastic dominance). But, more importantly, the shirking worker ends up with
higher material payoff than all others, as redistribution guarantees him a higher in-
come, but they make no effort. The “social preferences” make this worker “feel bad”
enough about this that she does not want to deviate. In the equilibrium with no effort
nobody wants to deviate. Any deviator would end up with a lower final utility than the
others (there would be redistribution which guarantees equal income, but the deviator
incurs the effort cost), and agents have the same utility already without a deviation.
3.2 Control treatments
We also introduce three control treatments:
EXCLUSION: In this treatment only those subjects who choose effort in the first
stage can vote for redistribution in the second stage, the decision being taken by
majority rule between them. Those who choose NO effort are excluded from re-
distribution and receive yL. A necessary condition for the existence of the all effort
equilibrium is A> yL.8 This equilibrium exists if players have constant relative risk
aversion with an Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient r ≥ 0.1.
We run this extension in order to get more evidence on whether the rich indicate that
they like to redistribute only to those who choose effort and then are poor.
After redistribution all individuals of the redistributive pool are equal, unlike in the
main treatment where because of sunk cost if there is redistribution the poor who
do not choose effort are the richest. We also look at this with the no-effort treatment
below.
8It is still a weakly dominant strategy to vote No if rich, and Yes if poor.
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UNANIMITY: In this case redistribution takes place only if all vote Yes. If all agents
have the same preferences, then only one equilibrium exists. The high equilibrium
exists if 23u(y
H − c)+ 13u(y
L − c) > u(yL).
This all effort equilibrium9 exists if players have constant relative risk aversion with
an Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient r ≥ 0 (that is, if agents’ risk aversion is no
higher than with logarithmic preferences).
NO-EFFORT: In this treatment there is no effort stage and wages are determined
randomly, while voting takes place according to majority rule. Alternatively one
can think of this treatment as modeling a situation in which effort is costless, and
thus a strictly dominant strategy. The unique undominated equilibrium in the stage
game is that the rich will vote No and the poor will vote Yes for redistribution. With
just one equilibrium in the stage game, there is only one equilibrium in the repeated
game.
The point of running this extension is that here being rich depends only on luck,
which should make redistribution less of an “ethical” issue. Additionally, it allows
us to test whether the fact that agents who made effort in the main treatment end
up, under redistribution, with ex-post utility lower than other agents (they have the
same money and they made effort) has any impact on the possibility of achieving
redistribution.
4 Experimental design
Sessions were run at a PC pool (LeeX) in the Department of Economics and Business
at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, in November 2004, January and February
2005 and May 2010. In 2004 students were notified via posters within the university
and had to sign up on a list at the door of the laboratory. In 2005 and 2010 students
could sign in through on-line recruiting system, ORSEE. All sessions were comput-
erized, using a program done with z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Students were seated
in a random order at PCs. Instructions in Spanish (see Supplementary Material for
English translation) were then read aloud and questions were answered in private.
Throughout the sessions students were not allowed to communicate and could not
see others’ screens.
The basic design is the following:
The experiment consisted of two stages, an effort stage and a voting stage. In the
effort stage all subjects within the same group had to decide whether or not to choose
effort. After everybody had decided, those who did not choose effort received a fixed
payoff (L= 30) and those who chose effort had to pay a cost of 20 and participated
in a random lottery, independently drawn for each subject, which determined a high
(H = 100) or a low (L= 30) income with probability p = 2/3 of eventH happening.
This is, the lottery that they buy by making effort is: 〈H = 100,L = 30;p(H) =
2/3〉.
In the second stage, subjects had to vote for or against equal redistribution of
the total sum of income to all their members. After the first stage, and before voting,
9Again, with voting determined by the weakly dominant strategy to vote No if rich, and Yes if poor.
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Table 1 The different treatments. Each session generates 2 independent observations
Treatment Effort Voting Rule Who Votes # of sessions # of subjects
Effort/majority YES Majority all 5 90
Effort/unanimity YES Unanimity all 3 54
Effort/exclusion YES Majority those who choose effort 3 54
No Effort/majority NO Majority all 3 54
subjects were informed of the number of subjects who chose effort, the number of rich
(with H income), the total sum to be equally distributed if there were enough votes
for redistribution, the individual income if there were no redistribution (excluding
costs), the individual income if there were redistribution (excluding costs), and the
cost of effort.
The main treatment is as the basic treatment with majority voting in the second
stage.Wewill call this effort-majority treatment.We also introduce the 3 control treat-
ments exposed in Sect. 3.2: (1) Effort-exclusion majority rule, (2) Effort-unanimity
rule and (3) No-effort-majority rule
In each session there were two separate groups of 9 subjects each. Each group of
the same subjects interacted together for 50 periods according to the rules of one of
the above treatments. No subject could participate in more than one session. We run
5 sessions of the effort-majority rule (thus 10 independent observations), 3 sessions
of the effort-unanimity rule (6 observations), 3 session of effort-exclusion majority
rule (6 observations), and 3 session of no effort-majority rule (6 observations). At
the end of the experiment one period was chosen randomly (the same for all subjects
of a session) and each subject was paid according to the points he earned in that
period with an exchange rate of 2 points = 1 Euro. This set up was chosen in order
to minimize the effect of self-insurance. This is, if in a repeated game agents could
insure across time (say, by saving, or by receiving a payoff equal to the average across
periods), they would not need to vote for redistribution. Since our intention was to
test for the possibility of social insurance (this is, across people, not across time), we
opted for eliminating this possibility. Table 1 summarizes the different sessions with
the number of participating subjects.
Moreover, this choice does not alter the theoretical equilibria. Clearly, it does not
change the equilibrium structure of the static game, since any period can be chosen.
But it does not eliminate either the repeated game equilibrium. For such an equilib-
rium to exist, what is needed is a belief that a “wrong” action in a particular period
switches the actions in the remaining periods, and that in those periods the expected
payoffs change with those actions. But since the period chosen for actual payoffs is
unknown at any point in time, the expected future payoffs for the subjects are still
subject to change with the chosen actions. There may be a problem with this setup
if the agents did not understand well the probabilistic structure of the payoffs. But
behavior seems to be pretty consistent and reasonable during the game, so we do not
think this is an important issue.
The payment for each subject was on average 30 Euros including the show up fee.
Each session lasted about 1 1/2 hours.
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5 Behavior of the experimental subjects
We summarize the behavior of the experimental subjects in two tables and four fig-
ures.10 Table 2 shows the main results of each session of each treatment pooled over
all periods. Table 3 shows the average results within a treatment (plus a distinction
between high and low redistribution groups in the main treatment, to be explained
below). In Fig. 1 we present a graphical representation of the time evolution of each
of the groups of the main treatment (Effort/Majority voting). In Figs. 2, 4 and 3 we
present the time evolution of all groups in the Exclusion, No-Effort and Unanimity
treatments respectively. In this section we interpret these results and answer our main
research question: Do agents behave in a manner consistent with Markovian equilib-
rium? Is there scope to sustain Rousseaunian equilibrium?11
5.1 Effort/majority voting
Looking at the averages inside groups (Table 2) in the main treatment (with effort
stage and majority voting) is easy to observe that some groups have high effort and
no redistribution (groups 1, 3 and 10) while the rest have low effort and redistribution.
In the high effort groups more than 80% of the agents exert effort, while redistribution
seldom occurs. In the remaining 7 sessions, the effort levels converge to those of the
low effort equilibrium. Aggregate effort levels are typically far below 50% with one
exception of 60% (see first column of Table 2). These two sets of groups correspond
to the two equilibria of the stage game.
A high level of effort tends to produce a high number of rich individuals (remem-
ber that people choosing to make effort get the high level of income with 23 prob-
ability) and high levels of aggregate income in this experiment are associated with
low redistribution levels. More precisely, when the majority of the players is poor
in a given period, redistribution took place 90% of the time across all periods and
groups. When the majority was rich, redistribution occurred 15% of the time. Across
all groups the majority was poor in 74.6% of all periods.
The poor vote overwhelmingly in favor of redistribution in all groups, with some
quantitatively small (but sometimes statistically significant) differences between dif-
ferent subgroups of poor people. For example, there is a difference in YES votes
between poor individuals who chose no effort (91%) and those who chose effort
(86%) (see Table 3, effort majority). This difference is significant at the 0.055 level
using a binomial test, since in 8 out of all 10 groups no effort choosers show higher
propensity to vote yes than effort choosers. There is also a statistical difference be-
tween those poor individuals who chose to make no effort in the two different kinds
of effort groups (99–100% vote YES in groups with high average effort level, 83%
vote YES in groups with low average effort level) with a value of U = 21, p = 0.008.
There is, on the other hand, no statistically significant difference in voting patterns
between those poor individuals who chose to make effort in the two different kinds
10In Appendix C we report the distribution of Payoff in the different treatments.
11The total expected payoff if all agents make effort is 76.66= 1/3 ∗ 30+ 2/3 ∗ 100.
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Table 2 Averages for all groups
Group # / treatment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% effort % red/rich % red/poor % red/no eff. % red exp pay
01 Effort - Majority 0.87 0.12 0.97 1.00 0.46 52.91
02 Effort-Majority 0.34 0.07 0.68 0.90 0.92 37.82
03 Effort-Majority 0.81 0.07 0.82 1.00 0.32 53.80
04 Effort-Majority 0.60 0.24 1.00 0.85 0.76 44.71
05 Effort-Majority 0.18 0.22 0.65 0.74 0.76 33.49
06 Effort-Majority 0.20 0.1 0.77 0.82 0.8 35.33
07 Effort-Majority 0.31 0.28 0.87 0.86 0.96 38.51
08 Effort-Majority 0.34 0.15 0.93 0.96 0.98 37.47
09 Effort-Majority 0.48 0.03 0.93 0.97 0.78 43.36
10 Effort-Majority 0.82 0.024 0.99 0.99 0.36 51.82
01 Effort-Unanimity 0.73 0.21 0.75 0.91 0 51.11
02 Effort-Unanimity 0.77 0.33 0.91 0.87 0 48.53
03 Effort-Unanimity 0.73 0.17 0.85 0.94 0 50.51
04 Effort-Unanimity 0.79 0.25 0.80 0.91 0 50.20
05 Effort-Unanimity 0.79 0.29 0.98 0.98 0 49.76
06 Effort-Unanimity 0.80 0.11 0.93 0.91 0 49.27
01 Effort-Exclusion 0.97 0.3 0.95 n.a. 0.62 54.40
02 Effort-Exclusion 0.95 0.19 0.94 n.a. 0.34 54.80
03 Effort-Exclusion 0.95 0.20 0.97 n.a. 0.44 54.80
04 Effort-Exclusion 0.93 0.34 0.94 n.a. 0.56 56.73
05 Effort-Exclusion 0.98 0.07 0.97 n.a. 0.35 53.6
06 Effort-Exclusion 0.97 0.23 0.99 n.a. 0.39 57.4
01 No Effort n.a. 0.22 0.76 n.a. 0.32 74.33
02 No Effort n.a. 0.2 0.87 n.a. 0.18 79.62
03 No Effort n.a. 0.21 0.90 n.a. 0.22 58.06
04 No Effort n.a. 0.04 0.96 n.a. 0.08 58.22
05 No Effort n.a. 0.17 0.98 n.a. 0.16 58.22
06 No Effort n.a. 0.19 0.98 n.a. 0.31 58.66
Columns:
(1) Percentage of agents exerting effort (unconditional)
(2) Percentage of votes for redistribution conditional on the agent being rich
(3) Percentage of votes for redistribution conditional on the agent being poor
(4) Percentage of votes for redistribution conditional on the agent having made no effort in first stage
(5) Percentage of votes for redistribution (unconditional)
(6) Average pay-off
of groups (93% vote YES in groups with high average effort level, 83% in vote YES
groups with high average effort level).
The rich, on the other hand, vote overwhelmingly against redistribution. They also
show a slightly different behavior in the different subgroups: in groups with high av-
erage effort levels 7% of them vote YES and in the low effort groups 16% vote YES.
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Table 3 Treatment averages. Separating high-low effort groups in main treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% effort % red/rich % red/poor % red/no eff. % red exp pay
Effort-Majority-HE 0.83 0.07 0.93 1.00 0.38 52.84
Effort-Majority-LE 0.35 0.16 0.83 0.87 0.85 38.67
Effort-Majority 0.49 0.13 0.86 0.91 0.71 42.92
Effort-Unanimity 0.77 0.23 0.87 0.92 0.00 49.90
Effort-Exclusion 0.96 0.22 0.96 n.a. 0.45 55.29
No Effort n.a. 0.17 0.91 n.a. 0.21 57.5
Total 0.64 0.19 0.88 0.90 0.51 46.67
This is significantly different on a 9% level (U = 16.5). Notice, however, that the
differences between any two subgroups of rich people is much smaller than between
a given subgroup of rich compared to any subgroup of poor people. In any case this
is the reverse than you would expect in the “Rousseaunian” equilibrium.12
The small differential behavior of different subgroups, together with the different
initial conditions on effort, may explain the different behavior over time in different
sessions, which we discuss below.
We summarize these facts in:
Observation 1 The rich and the poor are clearly distinguished in their behavior.
The poor people typically vote YES, and the rich typically vote NO with only slight
differences in the different groups.
5.1.1 Behavior over time. Convergence to equilibria
In Fig. 1 we show, for every one of the 10 independent groups, the effort choice, the
number of poor subjects and the number of yes votes for redistribution. These num-
bers are averaged over the 9 subjects in the group and over blocks of 5 consecutive
periods. We also show, for each group, the proportion of periods in each block of 5
when there was redistribution (note that this is a number between 0 and 1).
We see two distinct patterns:
1. There are three groups (1.1, 2.1 and 5.2) which maintain high average levels of
effort (7.8 to 8.6 out of 9 subjects in the three groups) with relatively low levels of
redistribution (32% to 46% averaged over all periods).
2. There are 6 groups which in the first periods of the experiment have intermediate
levels of effort (3.8 to 6.8 out of 9) and in the final periods have low levels effort
(less than 2 out of 9). These groups also have high levels of redistribution during
the whole time (76% to 98% across the 6 groups). In one of these groups (group
5.1), it looks like there was an unsuccessful attempt to revert to a situation with
12We can presume that this pattern of voting arises from the fact that in low effort groups there are more
poor agents, thus providing partial support for some type of social preferences.
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Fig. 1 Time series of effort majority groups
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Fig. 1 (Continued)
higher effort levels. An additional group (group 2.2) started out with a high effort
level (8.2) and nevertheless ended up with low effort and high redistribution.
We summarize these facts in:
Observation 2 In the majority of groups (7/10) behavior in the final periods is simi-
lar to the low effort equilibrium with high redistribution, but we also see some groups
whose behavior in the final periods is similar to the high effort equilibrium with low
redistribution. There are no groups whose behavior is similar to the (“Rousseaunian”)
equilibrium with high effort and high redistribution.
The initial condition seems to explain whether final behavior looks more like one
or the other equilibrium. In Table 2 we report average effort levels, as well as the
voting patterns for the rich, the poor who made effort, and the poor who did not make
effort. We also report on that table the average redistribution levels for each single
group and across all sessions of every treatment. Comparing the initial effort level at
the beginning of the session (first five periods), we observe in the high effort sessions
an average effort level of 8.26, while it is 5.51 in the sessions with low effort in the
final periods. This difference is significant different at the 0.02 level (U = 20), using
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test. We obtain a similar result by comparing the initial
redistribution level in the high effort sessions (0.2) and in the remaining session (0.8).
The difference is significant also at p = 0.02 (for U = 20).
We summarize these facts in:
Observation 3 Initial behavior of effort seems to be one driving force explaining the
behavior in the final periods. The higher is the initial effort in a group, the more likely
is that group to end in the high-effort/no-redistribution equilibrium. The less initial
effort in the group, the more likely is that group to end up in the low-effort/high-
redistribution equilibrium.
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5.1.2 Hobbes vs. Rousseau: what determines the voting of the rich?
Thus, we have seen that the behavior of the agents after a learning period is con-
sistent with the set of equilibria in the stage game, while there is no group whose
collective behavior is consistent with the non-Markov first best equilibrium that we
have deemed “Rousseaunian”.
This is clear indication that agents are not conditioning their votes in payoff ir-
relevant information. In particular, a notorious salient feature of the “Rousseaunian”
non-Markov behavior is that the vote of rich agents should depend on the degree of
effort exerted by poor agents, as they vote for redistribution in order to punish the
misbehaving agents and to revert to a situation with no redistribution. From Observa-
tion 1 we know that an agent’s vote depends critically on whether she is rich or poor
and marginally on whether she exerted effort or not. Now we intend to test directly if
the voting behavior depends on the degree of effort realized by the poor agents. If it
does not, there is no scope for non-Markov behavior.
We do so using Tables 4 and 5. In both tables we present results investigating un-
der which circumstances an individual votes in favor of redistribution in our main
[base–line] treatment. Table 4 runs a probit determining the probability that an indi-
vidual votes in favor of redistribution for all the individuals and during all the periods.
Table 5 does the same but restricting the sample to those agents who were rich when
they voted.
The right hand side variables are characteristics of the individual and of the state
of the economy during the period:
• “largeperiod” is a dummy that takes value 1 if the number of times that the agents
have played is larger than 15, that is, after agents have had time to learn how the
other agents are playing.
• “ipooreffort” and “irich” are dummies that determine the type that the agent has
when she votes.
– “ipooreffort” takes value 1 if the agent has made effort but is unlucky.
– “irich” takes the value 1 if the agent has made the effort, and she is “rich”. Thus,
the reference group are the agents who made no effort.
• “n-effort”, “redistpast” and “n-effortpast” look at general characteristics of the
economy at the time of the vote which are known to the agent.
– “n-effort” is the number of agents who did make effort in the current period.
– “redistpast” is a dummy that takes value 1 if there was redistribution in the
previous period.
– “n-effortpast” is the number of agents who made effort the previous period.
• “ratio-effort-poor” is the ratio of the number of poor who made effort to the total
number of poor.
• Finally we introduce control for individual effects and session effects in the form
of dummies for each individual and for each session. We also control for the vote
of the agents in the previous period with the variable “pastvote”.
Table 4 presents the results for all individuals and periods. Column (1) reports
the results with controls for individual heterogeneity, while column (2) presents the
results without individual dummies. Not surprisingly the larger effect corresponds to
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Table 4 Probit on voting for redistribution. All agents, main treatment
All Sample, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main Treatment
largeperiod 0.109 0.111 0.109 0.111 0.107 0.107
(0.074) (0.069) (0.094) (0.087) (0.074) (0.069)
ipooreffort −.393∗∗∗ −.479∗∗∗ −.393∗ −.479∗∗ −.386∗∗∗ −.453∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.09) (0.218) (0.226) (0.104) (0.09)
irich −3.424∗∗∗ −3.215∗∗∗ −3.424∗∗∗ −3.215∗∗∗ −3.418∗∗∗ −3.196∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.088) (0.318) (0.287) (0.107) (0.088)
n-effort 0.279∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.044) (0.042) (0.026) (0.024)
redispast 0.275∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.068) (0.081) (0.07) (0.075) (0.069)
n-effortpast 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025
(0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
pastvote 0.115∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.054)
constant −.585∗ −.390∗ −.585∗∗∗ −.390∗∗ −.652∗ −.479∗∗
(0.351) (0.209) (0.17) (0.156) (0.354) (0.211)
Marginal effects
largeperiod 0.039 0.04 0.039 0.04 0.039 0.039
ipooreffort −.147∗∗∗ −.180∗∗∗ −.147∗ −.180∗∗ −.144∗∗∗ −.170∗∗∗
irich −.912∗∗∗ −.890∗∗∗ −.912∗∗∗ −.890∗∗∗ −.911∗∗∗ −.888∗∗∗
n-effort 0.099∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
redispast 0.1∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
n-effortpast 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
pastvote 0.041∗ 0.072∗∗∗
Session Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual Controls Y N Y N Y N
Number of obs 4312 4410 4312 4410 4312 4410
Pseudo R2 0.569 0.51 0.569 0.510 0.569 0.513
Standard deviations in parenthesis. (∗) coefficients are significant at the 95% significance level; (∗∗) at the
99% and (∗∗∗) at the 99.9%
rich individuals, who are much less likely to vote for redistribution than anybody else
in the economy. Poor agents who made effort are less likely to vote for redistribution
than the ones who did not make the effort, but they vote for redistribution with a
much larger probability than the rich ones. This might be the consequence of a certain
inertia in voting in the equilibrium without redistribution.13 The variable n-effort has
a positive and significant effect, but as we will see below is not because the rich react
to it, but because the poor do: the more individuals did effort the more rich there are,
and the larger is the cake to share if there is redistribution.
13Another possibility is that people make effort out of ideological fervor, and this fervor bars some of them
from completely enjoying redistribution when they need it.
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Including the previous period voting decision of the agent as a regressor, or cluster-
ing the errors by group does not change these results (see columns (3)–(6) in Table 4).
In Table 5 we address the main issue raised by our experiment: do agents act in a
non-Markovian fashion? In such a case we would expect the rich agents to react to
the effort made by the poor. That is, if the poor were poor because they were lazy I
would not vote for redistribution, but if they were poor out of bad luck I would be
more prone to favor redistribution.
Thus, we run a probit to determine the probability of voting for redistribution but
restricting our sample to the agents and periods of time when the individuals are rich.
That is, we include in the sample only the occasions when individuals were rich,
and see if their probability of voting for redistribution depends on the state of the
economy. In particular, we see if it depends on the level of effort being exerted by the
poor agents. Columns (1) and (3) include individual dummies, and columns (3) and
(4) a variable determining the effort exerted by the poor.14
Clearly the rich agents do not react to their environment. They do not vote against
redistribution because the poor do not make effort: they vote against redistribution
because they are rich and the poor would expropriate them from their money (see in-
significant coefficient of ratio effort poor). It is Hobbes, not Rousseau, who explains
their behavior. The only thing to which they seem to react is the passage of time:
once they have learned to play the game, they systematically vote against redistri-
bution, and only in the initial periods there might be a larger probability of voting
for redistribution (see significant coefficient for large period). Thus, we can state the
following observation:
Observation 4 Rich agents do not condition their vote on the number of poor agents
who made effort. After a learning period, voting patterns are consistent with the stage
game equilibria: poor vote for redistribution and rich against it, irrespectively on
whether the poor arrive to their state via misfortune or via misbehavior. There is
no hint of non-Markov behavior.
As in Table 4, the inclusion as a regressor of the previous period voting decision,
or clustering the errors by group does not change these results (see colums (3)–(6) in
Table 5).
5.2 Control treatments
5.2.1 Exclusion if no effort
With our exclusion treatment, the rich can vote for a sort of redistribution which helps
only the ‘deserving’ poor. In that treatment the individuals who chose no effort cannot
participate in redistribution.
Figure 2 presents the six groups of Effort-exclusion-majority-rule treatment. In
Table 2 we display average effort levels, as well as the voting patterns for all indi-
viduals across treatments. Effort levels are very high (on average 96%, compared
to 83% in the high effort groups of the main treatment, a significant difference
14The number of observations varies because multicolinearity issues induce us to drop many individuals
when including individual dummies.
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Fig. 2 Time series of effort exclusion groups
with U = 18,p = 0.01). Redistribution is 45% on average, ranging from 34% to
62% in the different groups. This is similar to the redistribution in the high effort
groups of our main treatment, which is 38%15 and very different from the level of
redistribution-85%-in the low effort groups of the main treatment.
15The difference is not statistically significant. Note, however, the low number of observations.
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The proportion of rich people who vote YES is 22% across periods, which is
significantly different from the proportion of the main treatment with high effort (7%)
(U = 16.5 and p = 0.023). Comparing the voting patterns of the rich people in the
low effort groups of the main treatment (16%) and their behavior in this treatment
(22%), there is not a significant difference with U = 28.5,p = 0.14. The proportion
of YES votes of the rich is still very far from that of the poor in the low effort groups
of the main treatment (over 80%) or in this treatment (over 90%).
Notice that if there is a treatment where “Rousseaunian” behavior has a good
environment, it is here. By construction, in this treatment redistribution would treat
differently those among the poor who misbehaved from those who were unfortunate.
In spite of this, 75% of the rich individuals vote against redistribution. There seems
to be little empathy towards the unfortunate.
Observation 5 Even when the rich players can control who benefits from redistribu-
tion, a large majority of them still dislike redistribution. However, a few individuals
prefer redistribution when they can control who benefits (the YES votes increase from
13% in the main treatment to 22% in this one).
The difference in the proportion of yes votes by the rich between treatments can
be explained by the fact that in the majority game, voting no is the only way to sus-
tain a high effort equilibrium outside the Rousseaunian world (where we cannot be,
by our empirical result above). In the exclusion (and unanimity, see below) worlds,
redistribution is a “consumption” good, you do it because you like it, not to sustain an
equilibrium. It can be done for “fairness” reasons (see Alesina and Angeletos 2005;
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, or Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
5.2.2 Unanimity
A treatment where redistribution requires an unanimous agreement, is useful to check
how much effort is made when subjects cannot be involuntarily expropriated. In this
case, the final utility does not depend essentially on other people’s decision, so the
main consideration for whether an individual should make effort or not is her de-
gree of risk aversion (high effort implies choosing a lottery with high mean and high
dispersion).
Figure 3 shows the six groups of the unanimity rule treatments. The average effort
level (77%) is significantly lower than in the high effort groups of the main treatment
(83%) withU = 12,p = 0.03. It is also significantly lower than in the exclusion treat-
ment (95%), with U = 44 and p = 0.005. There is no redistribution in any period.
There is no difference in the proportion of YES votes by the rich between the ex-
clusion treatment (26%) and the unanimity treatment (23%). As pointed out before,
since a player can always impede redistribution, to choose to make effort indicates a
low degree of risk aversion.
Across all groups the rich typically do not vote for redistribution (the averages
range between 7% to 25% in the different treatments). Thus, it seems clear that the
rich do not vote against redistribution because they dislike laziness. Instead, they do
not want to contribute to the poor, independently of the cause of poverty. On the other
hand, the poor independently of their effort agree on voting YES to redistribution
(ranging from 82% to 95% on average).
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Fig. 3 Time series of unanimity groups
5.2.3 No effort
With the no effort treatment, wealth is the result of a purely random outcome over
which individuals have no control. So the poor are in such a state because they were
unlucky, not because they were dishonest. Under these circumstances Rousseau might
expect individuals to be more prone to help one another. However, it is not an equi-
librium to do so when players do not have other-regarding preferences.
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Fig. 4 Time series of no-effort groups
Figure 4 shows the six No effort-majority groups. On average redistribution occurs
21% of the time and 17% of the rich and 91% of the poor vote YES. Thus, also in
this treatment the rich do not show much compassion for poor people. Notice that we
mentioned that an important reason for this treatment was to test whether the fact that
agents who made effort in the main treatment end up, under redistribution, with ex-
post utility lower than other agents (they have the same money and they made effort)
has any impact the possibility of achieving redistribution. The answer is clearly that
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it does not make much difference (YES votes by the rich increase only from 13% to
17%).
5.2.4 Determinants of voting in the control treatments
In Sect. 5.1.2 we presented regressions showing that the Rich agents do not condition
their vote on the number of poor agents who made effort. After a learning period, vot-
ing patterns are consistent with the stage game equilibria. In the appendix we show
the results of analogous regressions for the additional treatments. The results in most
cases are basically the same.16 The only mildly puzzling result is what happens in
the treatment with exclusion, where the rich do not seem to be biased against redistri-
bution (the point estimate is still negative, but insignificant). In addition the n_effort
variable has a negative and significant coefficient. As we said when discussing the
descriptive statistics of this treatment, redistribution is a “consumption” good in that
environment. Subjects can do it because they like it, not to sustain an equilibrium.
Hence, it is natural that the behavior does not respond to the same determinants.
6 Conclusions
The main result of this paper is that our experimental subjects behave so that rich
subjects vote against redistribution and poor vote for redistribution, independently
of the rule linking voting to allocations or the reasons for poverty. This rules out a
“Rousseaunian” equilibrium with effort and redistribution. And even a static equi-
librium with effort but without redistribution is fragile in the lab. Hence, the incentive
and efficiency issues of our laboratory welfare state are large.
In our game it is theoretically possible to sustain an equilibrium where everybody
makes effort, and where everybody who is unlucky gets help from the lucky ones,
what we call a Rousseaunian equilibrium. Its enforcement would be possible via
a strategy relying in the (credible) punishment of reverting to the (bad) Hobbesian
equilibrium. Our results show that this equilibrium is not reached. When there is
effort in our experiments, redistribution is not sustained over time. This result arises
in one of two ways. In three of our main treatment sessions with high initial effort,
the rich did not want to redistribute from the beginning. One other session (session
2, group 2) started with high effort and high redistribution, but behavior converged to
the equilibrium with low effort. We interpret this as implying that there is no social
contract binding the destinies of rich and poor. The rich simply do not feel indebted to
the deserving poor. Instead, our subject groups either reach the equilibrium with high
effort and no redistribution, or the one with low effort and nothing to redistribute.
In our design, the redistribution, when it happens, is complete. Would the Rich be
willing to tolerate partial redistribution? One answer comes from our control treat-
ments. Rich subjects vote against redistribution, independently of the rule linking vot-
ing to allocations or the reasons for poverty. We see no good reason why they would
16We decided against running joint regressions with treatment dummies because the environments are so
different that the effect of the independent variables could (and indeed does) change between treatments
and in some case those variables do not even exist (think e.g. of the treatments without effort).
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behave differently under partial redistribution. To this reasoning, one could reply that
in reality there is some redistribution, most of the time partial. We strongly believe
that our experimental results point to other reasons for the existence of redistribution.
Perhaps the threat of revolution, or other disruptive forms of redistribution, explains
the existence of redistribution, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) have forcefully ar-
gued. This seems to us a better explanation for this phenomenon than a Rousseaunian
pact, which our evidence rejects.
A reading of our results can be that if a society has an encompassing welfare state,
then its presence must have strong effects on efficiency. And conversely, if a society
does not provide a generous redistribution system, it is probably because its political
institutions prevent the “poor” from getting enough political leverage.
From a technical point of view our results can be read as indicating that, at least
when confronting politico-economic situations, agents tend to disregard non payoff
relevant events. The outcomes of the game thus constitute Markov perfect equilibria.
This is good news for the large macroeconomic literature that has dealt with the issue,
as it has almost in its totality concentrated on Markov perfect equilibria.
This paper is a first step in an experimental investigation of the political economy
of redistribution in a context with effort decisions and multiple equilibria. But there
are some important issues that we have left behind. For example, in our framework
the “effort” decision consists basically on the choice of a lottery with a cost. This
may not yield the same sense of entitlement that effort normally conveys in real life.
More research would help to clarify this point.
It would also be important to determine to which extent agents behave rationally
in voting on inter-temporal issues. More precisely, an important issue is to determine
whether people take into account the effect of their vote on the future distribution of
rich and poor, and how this future distribution will affect the future outcome of the
political game. We intend to answer that question in a follow-up paper.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof As a first step, notice that, in the voting stage of the game, it is weakly domi-
nant to vote vi = Y when yi = yL and vi =N when yi = yH . The reason is that the
vote affects the final payoff only if the voter is pivotal. In that case, voting Y rather
than N shifts the outcome from yi = yL to
∑n
j=1 yj/9 when poor and from yi = yH
to
∑n
j=1 yj/9 when rich.
Then, we need to check first that ei = eH is a best-response in the first period
when ej = eH for all j ∈N, j 6= i. This is indeed true as, in that case, the expected
payoff from choosing ei = eH is A whereas the payoff from choosing ei = eL is B
and by assumption A>B.
Finally, we need to check that ei = eL is a best-response in the first period when
ej = e
L for all j ∈N, j 6= i. This is indeed true as, in that case, the expected payoff
from choosing ei = eH is C whereas the payoff from choosing ei = eL is yL and by
assumption C < u(yL). In one of them ei = eH for all i ∈ N and in the other one
ei = e
L for all i ∈ N . In both equilibria, for all i ∈ N, vi = Y when yi = yL and
vi =N . ¤
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof The strategies that sustain the equilibrium are as follows:
I γi(ht−1)= (eH , Y ) ∀t ≤ 50−K − 1, if for all τ ≤ t − 1 there was no unilateral
deviation from (eH , Y ).
II γi(ht−1) = (eH ,N) ∀t > 50 − K − 1, if for all τ ≤ 50 − K − 1 there was no
unilateral deviation from (eH , Y ).
III γi(ht−1)= (eL, Y ), otherwise.
Obviously the strategies prescribe equilibrium actions after histories in II and III,
as they are static (and unconditional) equilibria of the stage game. In histories like I
the strategies prescribe equilibrium actions since a deviation implies a gain of D−E
with respect to the equilibrium action, but a loss of at least K(A − yL) afterward.
Then the deviation is not optimal since D −E <K(A− yL) by assumption. ¤
Appendix C: Payoffs
We now show how the differences in behavior across treatments and equilibria impact
the distribution of payoffs.
Obviously, in the low-effort groups of the main treatment we find the lowest in-
equality (standard deviation is on average 13.01) while in the high-effort groups the
inequality is much higher (standard deviation is 25.64). The highest inequality can be
found in the Unanimity and in the No effort treatments (standard deviations are 31.32
and 28.55 respectively). The inequality of the Exclusion treatment is not significantly
different from that of the high effort groups of the main treatment (standard deviation
is 24.95).
In terms of average monetary payoffs, the richest groups are those in the Exclusion
treatment (55.18) and in the No effort treatment (76.98). The numbers are not com-
parable strictly speaking, as in the No effort sessions the subjects can get the “good”
lottery without paying an effort cost. But even if we subtracted the effort cost (say
because effort was compulsory and not a decision) to make the numbers comparable,
we still would have an average of 56.98.
Unanimity produces slightly worse average payoffs (49.90) than in the high effort
groups in the Effort-majority rule treatments (52.84) and both are much better than
in the low effort groups of that same treatment (38.67).
Appendix D: Empirical analysis of other treatments
Tables 6, 7 and 8 report the analysis as in Table 4 for treatments other than our main
one. and Tables 9, 10 and 11 report the analysis as in 5.
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Table 6 Probit on voting for
redistribution. All sample,
effort-exclusion
Standard deviations in
parenthesis. (∗) coefficients are
significant at the 95%
significance level; (∗∗) at the
99% and (∗∗∗) at the 99.9%
All Sample, Effort-Exclusion (1) (2)
largeperiod −.042 −.052
(0.081) (0.072)
ipooreffort −3.859 −3.490
(157.848) (80.488)
irich −6.972 −6.146
(157.848) (80.488)
n-effort −.123∗ −.095
(0.065) (0.059)
redispast 0.243∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.066)
n-effortpast 0.049 0.058
(0.064) (0.057)
cons 6.535 5.891
(157.850) (80.490)
Session Controls Y Y
Individual Controls Y N
Number of obs 2646 2646
Pseudo R2 0.579 0.462
Table 7 Probit on voting for
redistribution. All sample,
effort-unanimity
Standard deviations in
parenthesis. (∗) coefficients are
significant at the 95%
significance level; (∗∗) at the
99% and (∗∗∗) at the 99.9%
All Sample, Effort-Unanimity (1) (2)
largeperiod 0.115 0.144∗∗
(0.077) (0.067)
ipooreffort −.169 −.255∗∗
(0.121) (0.1)
irich −2.560∗∗∗ −2.195∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.088)
n-effort −.002 0.007
(0.034) (0.028)
redispast
n-effortpast 0.009 0.012
(0.031) (0.027)
cons 2.368∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.541) (0.285)
Session Controls Y Y
Individual Controls Y N
Number of obs 2499 2646
Pseudo R2 0.520 0.378
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Table 8 Probit on voting for
redistribution. All sample, no
effort
Standard deviations in
parenthesis. (∗) coefficients are
significant at the 95%
significance level; (∗∗) at the
99% and (∗∗∗) at the 99.9%
All Sample, No Effort (1) (2)
largeperiod 0.004 0.011
(0.075) (0.068)
ipooreffort 2.675∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.071)
irich
n-effort
redispast −.060 −.037
(0.087) (0.077)
n-effortpast
cons −.169 −.880∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.091)
Session Controls Y Y
Individual Controls Y N
Number of obs 2646 2646
Pseudo R2 0.539 0.405
Table 9 Probit on voting for redistribution. Only rich agents, effort-exclusion
Only Rich, Effort-Exclusion (1) (2) (3) (4)
largeperiod −.087 −.091 0.077 0.081
(0.094) (0.079) (0.2) (0.162)
ratio-effort-poor −.470∗∗∗ −.326∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.069)
n-effort −.211∗∗∗ −.151∗∗
(0.072) (0.063)
redispast 0.318∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗ 0.417∗∗
(0.087) (0.073) (0.218) (0.169)
n-effortpast 0.018 0.053 0.043 0.069
(0.072) (0.062) (0.14) (0.116)
cons 0.662 0.345 −.349 −.160
(0.864) (0.715) (1.277) (0.999)
Session Controls Y Y Y Y
Individual Controls Y N Y N
Number of obs 1397 1682 283 381
Pseudo R2 0.261 0.052 0.287 0.136
Standard deviations in parenthesis. (∗) coefficients are significant at the 95% significance level; (∗∗) at the
99% and (∗∗∗) at the 99.9%
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Table 10 Probit on voting for redistribution. Only rich agents, effort-unanimity
Only Rich, Effort-Unanimity (1) (2) (3) (4)
largeperiod 0.117 0.17∗ 0.144 0.18∗
(0.123) (0.089) (0.133) (0.096)
ratio-effort-poor −.150∗∗ −.117∗∗
(0.068) (0.048)
n-effort 0.027 0.022
(0.054) (0.037)
redispast
n-effortpast −.055 0.012 −.053 0.016
(0.051) (0.036) (0.055) (0.038)
cons 0.834 −1.670∗∗∗ 0.927 −1.340∗∗∗
(0.927) (0.407) (1.053) (0.33)
Session Controls Y Y Y Y
Individual Controls Y N Y N
Number of obs 804 1339 731 1221
Pseudo R2 0.348 0.035 0.364 0.045
Standard deviations in parenthesis. (∗) coefficients are significant at the 95% significance level; (∗∗) at the
99% and (∗∗∗) at the 99.9%
Table 11 Probit on voting for redistribution. Only rich agents, no effort
Only Rich, No Effort (1) (2) (3) (4)
largeperiod −.109 −.078 −.370∗∗ −.255∗∗
(0.101) (0.08) (0.163) (0.128)
ratio-effort-poor −2.137∗∗∗ −1.184∗∗∗
(0.515) (0.399)
n-effort
redispast −.175 −.089 0.114 0.115
(0.118) (0.09) (0.174) (0.135)
n-effortpast
cons 0.676∗∗∗ −.760∗∗∗ −3.373∗∗∗ −1.565∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.102) (0.594) (0.322)
Session Controls Y Y Y Y
Individual Controls Y N Y N
Number of obs 1410 1795 526 592
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.038 0.397 0.023
Standard deviations in parenthesis. (∗) coefficients are significant at the 95% significance level; (∗∗) at the
99% and (∗∗∗) at the 99.9%
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